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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazards Reduction in Corporate
Financing: A Mechanism Design Model for PLS Contracts
Adil ELFAKIR and Mohamed TKIOUAT*
In this paper , we apply game theory to corporate financing using profit
and loss sharing (PLS) contracts. We employ mechanism design theory us-
ing two agents, a bank and a corporation which seeks financing through PLS
mode. We seek to find the usefulness of mechanism design in helping the bank
separating low type from high type corporations by designing two bundles of
contract with each contract directed in a compatible way towards the appro-
priate type of corporation. We found theoretical as well as simulation evidence
that our model helps in minimizing asymmetric information in the form of ad-
verse selection by forcing the corporation to reveal its type. The model also
helps in reducing asymmetric information in the form of moral hazards. This
is achieved by having the selected high type corporation select a high type
contract using a moral hazard premium as an incentive.
Key Words: Sharing ratio; Adverse selection; Assymetric information; Moral
hazards; Moral hazard premium (MHP); PLS contracts.
JEL Classification Numbers: C700, G32, D81, D82.
1. INTRODUCTION
One important part in decision making in a collective setting is that
individuals’ types and preferences are not observable. Therefore, mech-
anisms has to be inroduced to elicit individuals into revealing this type
of information. How these information can be revealed and how decision
makers can respond to individuals’ preferences based on such information
is referred to as mechanism design (E`iha´k et al., 2008). The challenge of a
mechanism designer is that the outcome of self-intersted parties should be
acceptable to all. In recognision of the importance of mechanism design,
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The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has awarded the 2007 Nobel Prize
in economic sciences to three economists Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin,
and Roger Myerson. Mechanism design started with the work of Hurwicz
(1960).
In agreement with the works of Friedrich von Hayek (1945), Hurwicz
confirmed that the failure of central planning was a result of information
dispersion and assymetries among economic agents. However, he argued
that the lack of incentives for economic agents prohibited them from shar-
ing trutful information with others. To overcome this problem Hurwicz
(1972) introduced the term incentive-compatibility which stresses on In-
formation sharing. Yet, this mechanism does not guarantee optimality as
the existence of assymetric information precludes Pareto efficiency (E`iha´k
et al., 2008). Hwoever this mechanism can be close to optimality than the
case without incentive compatibility (E`iha´k et al., 2008).
Another contribution to mechanism design, is the notion of “Revelation
principle” introduced by Roger Myerson. It simplifies the calculation of
the most efficient rules to get agent reveal their true information. Major
extentions of works about the revelation principle include Gibbard (1973),
Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Myerson (1979).
When it comes to Eric Maskin’s contribution, he has coined the “Imple-
mentation Theory” (Maskin, 1999) which became a radical part in mech-
anism design. It states when mechanisms can be designed that produce
incentive efficient equilibria. The idea is that under Myerson’s and others
work many solution can arise with different equlibria. Yet not all these
equilibria are in fact implementable. The importance of mechanism design
in tackeling information assymetries can be applied to many fields. One
such field is Profit and Loss sharing contracts (PLS) referred to in Islamic
finance as Musharakah. It is namely a partnership contract between a cap-
ital and labor providers. The sharing of profits is in accordance with a
pr-determined ratio (Rammal, 2004) while Losses are limited to partners
contributions (Usmani, 2002).
Mechanism design is mostely needed in Islamic Musharakah than in con-
ventional PLS contracts due to the following reasons:
• Fixed compensations are allowed on conventional system while they
are prohibited in Islamic Musharakah. The Financier in the later mode
might lose if the project fails.
• The financed agent is usually the provider of a lower share of capital.
He/she has an incentive to behave in an opportunistic manner.
• In conventional system, the financier might seek protection against
losses. this is not permissible under Islamic musharakh (Usmani, 2002).
The rest of the papers will be as follows:
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Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 elaborates the model. Section
4 explains the methods used. Section 5 illustrates the results. Section 6
presents a numerical application as well as a computer aided simulation.
section 7 is devoted to the discussion of the results. Finally, Section 9
presents a summary and suggests future extensions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
To reduce assymetric information that an agent holds against a financier
many dissipative signals can by exploited.
One such signal is collateral that efficient agents need to use to signal
their efficient type. This is consistent with works of Berger et al. (2011)
and Karim (2002). While this method is allowed in a conventional system,
it is prohibited in Islamic jurisprudence (Shariah law). The recourse to a
warranty is allowed only if there is a proof of negligence or violoation of
the terms of the PLS contracts 1.
Benchmarking on collateral, efficient managers might sign for low job
protection (Subramanian and Sheikh, 2002). This is in agreement with
other research as in (Subramanian and Sheikh, 2002). Yet, signing for low
job protection is considered unfair to the entrepreneur since the project
failures can be due to some uncontrollable factors l (ELFakir and Tkiouat,
2015a), (ElFakir and Tkiouat, 2015b).
Due deligence can be used to reduce moral hazards , in the form of mis-
reporting, in Musharakah. However, the extent of it is more in musharakh
than in concentional PLS Al Suwailem (2006).
The Entrepreneur’s participation in the project’s capital might be used
to reduce information assymetries in musharakah contracts (Karim, 2002).
In agreement with this argument, we have allowed the agent to participate
in the project capital in our model.
In dealing with moral hazard, in the form of low effort, Nabi (2013)
suggested a That the entrepreneur should participate with a minimum
capital contribution coupled with a minimum profit sharing ration. In our
model we propose the usage of two types of contracts (High and low) with
each type directed toward its compatible type of entrepreneurs.
One research suggested that moral hazards can be reduced under Mu-
daraba2 but cannot be solved under musharakah (Yousfi, 2013). We can
criticize this argument in the following way. First under Mudaraba, the
financier is the sole provider of capital and subsequently supports all types
1Adoption of AAOIFI Shariah Standard No. 12. Clause 3/1/4/1
2A form of business where the financier provides capital while the entrepreneur pro-
vides work.
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of risks. On the other hand, under losses are shared. Our reasonong is
inconsistent with the findings of Nabi (2013) and Innes (1990).
In a previous paper (ELFakir and Tkiouat, (2015a) of ours we have
proposed an incentive mechanism to reduce assymetric information. This
mechanism results in higher social value and more entrepreneurial negoti-
ation power in terms of the profit sharing ratio. The model howeverdoes
not provide for two contracts type as the current model does.
In order to assess the viability PLS contracts versus other modes of
financing such as ROSCA and debt-finance we have proposed in a previous
paper a new model called ROMCA (ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2016). Our
Simulation results shows that our rotating musharakah model, ROMCA,
prevails against debt finance when it comes to employment generation,
wealth creation, and consumption. It becomes even dominant under cases
of adverse random shocks with low market conditions and prevailed in cases
ofmoral hazards (ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2016).
In dealing with adverse selection and moral hazards , we have provided
some series of publications using two contracts. The purpose is to allow
for agents type separation. In the first paper, we suggested using two
types of contracts: one is effort based and the second is output based. A
theoritical evidence showed that an effort based contract can give higher
compensation to the agent as this contract offers a lower sharing ratio to
the financier (ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2015b). This result emphisises two
important Islamic concepts. First it emphasizes the sentiment of altruism
which the financier shows by taking a smaller profit sharing ratio. Second
it emphasizes the sentiment of positive reciprocity which the agent exhibits
by providing high effort.
In the second paper, we tried to reduce the adverse selection with respect
to Mudaraba using a model of two contracts combined with adverse selec-
tion index for each contract . We have manged to develop three types of
indices that can help financial institutions in their agent selection process
(ELFakir and Tkiouat, 2016a).
In the third paper , we tried to use a two contract concept in a game
theoretical approach under incomplete information . Menu contracting
was found not to be always the optimal option for moral hazard reduction
ELFakir and Tkiouat, (2016b).
3. THE MODEL
Our Model involves a Bank and a corporation engaging in a musharakah
contract wit a required funding F . Due to asymmetric information, the
bank can only provide partial financing and, therefore, need to decide on
the appropriate portion β of F to be delivered to the corporation. The
project provides a concave return V(β) with respect to the corporation cap-
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ital contribution β. The return function is common knowledge adjusted
with a productivity Θ which is private to the corporation and unknown to
the bank. The bank has a monitoring cost C(β) which is a function of its
contribution in the project such that: C(β) = c.F.β (Where 0 < c < 1 and
0 < β < 1).
The corporation can be of two types: High with probability P or Low
with probability P . A high (Low) type corporation have a productivity
factor Θ (Θ) and results in a high (Low) output than a low (High) type
and therfore merit a high (Low) financing β (β). We note as well that
Θ > Θ.
The payoff of the project when undertaken by the high type corporation
is Θ.V(β) while it is Θ.V(β) if undertaken by the low type corporation.
3.1. The Model under the Symmetric case
In this case, the bank knows the type of the corporation. The bank
shares the profit according to a predetermined sharing ratio α and losses
according to β. The corporation gets under the symetric case:
Ucorp/sym = (1− α).ΘV(β) − (1− β).F
which can be rewritten as:
Ucorp/sym = ΘV(β) − [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] (1)
We can put the second part of the equation:
T(β) = [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] (2)
This part represents the transfer of the project proceeds from the corpo-
ration to the bank. So the bank gives β.F to the corporation and receives
back T(β).
Since the bank knows the type of the corporation, it can set β in such a
way that the corporation just breaks even. i.e
ΘV(β) − [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] = 0
or alteratively
ΘV(β) = T(β)
So automatically T(β) is also concave The banks profit under the symetric
case is then:
Ubank/sym = T(β) − F − c.B.F
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Or alternatively:
Ubank/sym = T(β) − F.(1 + c.B) (3)
This is also a concave function which is a reasonable assumption for a risk
averse financier. We can then Maximize the bank’s profit at:
ΘV ′(β) = c.F (4)
The last equation has some important implications:
1) if Θ = 1 the bank will keep increasing its financing β to a level that
makes its marginal profit equal to its marginal cost i.e V ′(β) = c.F
2) if Θ > 1 the bank will keep increasing its financing β to a level that
makes its marginal profit equal to its marginal cost adjusted by the produc-
tivity factor Θ i.e V ′(β) = (c.F )/Θ This means that the bank can maximize
its profit at a lower level of financing if the corporation productivity is high
3) if 0 < Θ < 1 the bank will keep increasing its financing β to a level
that makes its marginal profit equal to its marginal cost adjusted by the
productivity factor Θ i.e V ′(β) = (c.F )/Θ This means that the bank can
maximize its profit at a higher level of financing if the corporation produc-
tivity is low
3.2. The model under asymmetric case
In this case the bank does not know whether it deals with a low type
corporation (Lcorp) or a high type corporation (Hcorp). Therefore, the
payoffs to the bank from the high type contract (Hcont) and the low type
contract (Lcont) are respectively:
Ubank/(asym;Hcont) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]
(5)
Ubank/(asym;Lcont) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]
(6)
Where this time:
T(β/Hcorp) = [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] (7)
T(β/Hcorp) = [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] (8)
T(β/Lcorp) = [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] (9)
T(β/Lcorp) = [α.ΘV(β) + (1− β).F ] (10)
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To be able to enter the contract, the corporation needs to satisfy two
types of constraints: individual rationality constraints and incentive com-
patibility constraints.
An individual rationality constraints means that the corporation can
only enter the project if its return from the projects is greater than its
reservation utility (0 in our case). So the individual rationality constraints
for the low and high type corporation respectively are given as:
(IRL) ΘV(β) − T(β/Lcorp) ≥ 0 (11)
(IRH) ΘV(β) − T(β/Hcorp) ≥ 0 (12)
An incentive compatible constraints means that the type of contract is
compatible with the type of the corporation that undertakes it:
(ICL) ΘV(β) − T(β/Lcorp) ≥ ΘV(β) − T(β/Lcorp) (13)
(ICH) ΘV(β) − T(β/Hcorp) ≥ ΘV(β) − T(β/Hcorp) (14)
In summary, the model is, then, an optimization problem taking the
form:
Maximize:
Ubank/(asym;Hcont) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]
Ubank/(asym;Lcont) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]
Subject to constraints:
(IRL) = ΘV(β) − T(β/Lcorp) ≥ 0
(IRH) = ΘV(β) − T(β/Hcorp) ≥ 0
(ICL) = ΘV(β) − T(β/Lcorp) ≥ ΘV(β) − T(β/Lcorp)
(ICH) = ΘV(β) − T(β/Hcorp) ≥ ΘV(β) − T(β/Hcorp)
(FC) = 0 < β < 1 and 0 < β < 1
Where the last is called the feasibility constraints where the contribution
ratios are between 0 and 1. The bank problem is to decide on the bundle
(β;T(β)) and the bundle (β;T(β))
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4. METHODOLOGY
We start by deciding on which constraints are binding. To do so we pro-
vide a game theoretical approach for each type of corporation.The strategy
of the bank is which bundle to offer among:
(β;T(β/Hcorp)); (β;T(β/Lcorp)); (β;T(β/Hcorp)); (β;T(β/Lcorp)).
On the other side, the strategy of the corporation is whether it should
participate in the contract or not. We proceed by dealing with each type
of corporation at a time:
4.1. The game between the bank and the low type company
From (7) the transfer T(β) depends on β and therefore the bundle (β
; T(β)) represents an incompatible combination. Likewise from (6) the
transfer T(β) depends on β and therefore the bundle (β ; T(β)) represents
an incompatible combination.
To make the high type corporation break even, the maximum it can get
is:
Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp) = 0
We deduce automatically that:
Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp) < 0 Since Θ < Θ
This means that the low type corporation can never choose the bundle
(β;T(β/Hcorp)) What is left then is the bundle (β;T(β/Hcorp)) which must
be an individually rational choice: i.e:
Θ.V(β) − T(β/Lcorp) ≥ 0. Since this is the only available choice for the
corporation to participate , the bank will set the payoff of the corporation
at its reservation utility given as 0. In this case IRL must be binding.
Θ.V(β) − T(β) = 0 (15)
We can then deduce the following reduced game form for both types of
corporation where the corporation is to participate (P) or not participate
(P) under the relevant fianncier capital contribution β.
Based on the individual rationality IRH the bundle (β ; T(β/Hcorp)) must
give at least a positive payoff for the high type corporation to be able to
participate. On the other hand, it can be shown that the bundle (β ;
T(β/Hcorp)) can also provide a positive payoff to the high type corporation:
Proof. We can adjust the payoff to the high type corporation from the
bundle (β ; T(β/Hcorp)) by adding and substracting simultaneouselyΘ.V(β).
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TABLE 1.
Payoff to the low type corporation under different bank’s bundles
Low Type Corporation
P NP
Bank β;T(β/Hcorp) a; b 0; 0
β;T(β/Lcorp) c; d 0; 0
a; b [T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]; Θ.V(β)−T(β/Lcorp)
c; d [T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]; Θ.V(β)−T(β/Lcorp)
TABLE 2.
Payoff to the High type corporation under different bank’s bundles
High Type Corporation
P NP
Bank β;T(β/Hcorp) e; f 0; 0
β;T(β/Lcorp) g; h 0; 0
e: f [T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]; Θ.V(β)−T(β/Hcorp)
g; h [T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]; Θ.V(β)−T(β/Hcorp)
We get:
Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp) =Θ.V(β) −Θ.V(β) + Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp)
=V(β)(Θ−Θ) > 0
The last result is true since from (15) we have Θ.V(β)−T(β/Hcorp) = 0 and
we have (Θ > Θ).
Based on ICH we must have:
Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp) ≥ Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp)
Both bundles are individually rational for the high corporation yet only
one bundle (β;T(β)) is incentive compatible.
Because the bank would like to minimize the rent the high type corpo-
ration can extract by undertaking a low type contract, it could reduce the
payoff from (β;T(β/Hcorp)) until it is just as equivalent to that of the bundle
(β;T(β/Hcorp)). This way the bundle (β;T(β/Hcorp)) can still be individually
rational and incentive compatible at the minimum rent extraction level.
To proceed we need to take the difference between the payoffs of the two
bundles.
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5. RESULTS
Taking the difference between the payoffs to the high type corporation
from the two bundles and replacing T(β/Hcorp) and T(β/Hcorp) by their form
in (6) and (7) gives:
R = [Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp)]− [Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp)]
Modifying we get:
R = V(β).(Θ− α.Θ)− V(β).Θ.(1− α)− F (β − β) (16)
Where R is the amount to be reduced from the payoff of the low type
contract and therefore represents an additional income to the bank.
Now we can reformulate the expected profit of the bank, the low type
corporation and the high type respectively as:
U(bank/(asym;Hcont)) = P .[T(β/Hcorp) − F.(1 + c.β)] + P .[T(β/Lcorp) − F.(1 + c.β)]
U(bank/(asym;Lcont)) = P .[T(β/Hcorp) − F.(1 + c.β)] + P .[T(β/Lcorp) − F.(1 + c.β)] +R
U(Hcorp/(asym;Hcont)) = Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp)
U(Hcorp/(asym;Lcont)) = Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp) −R
U(Lcorp/(asym;Hcont)) = Θ.V(β) − T(β/Lcorp)
U(Lcorp/(asym;Lcont)) = Θ.V(β) − T(β/Lcorp) −R
As we can see the amount R is added to the banks payoff and taken off
from the corporation payoff when the low type contract is selected. This
is done to deter the high type corporation from undertaking a low type
contract.
We can now infer the following break even conditions:
For the bank to at least break even from undertaking the low type con-
tract we must have:
U(bank/(asym;Lcont)) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+R ≥ 0
For the bank to at least break even from the high type contract we must
have:
U(bank/(asym;Hcont)) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+c.β)] ≥ 0
For the high type corporation to at least break even from the high type
contract we must have:
Θ.V(β) − T(β/Hcorp) ≥ 0
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To get a clear view of our work we propose a numerical application
followed by a computer aided simulation:
6. NUMERICAL APPLICATION AND SIMULATION
Consider the following output function: Vβ = K.(1 − β)0.5 Where K
represents the maximum output when the bank’s contribution is null. This
means that as the bank’s contribution in the project grows, the corporation
effort decreases resulting in a lower output.
The rest of the parameters are: F = 700; c = 3%;K = 1200; θ = 0.7; θ =
1.3;P = 0.2;P = 0.8;α = 60%
We get the following:
For the high type corporation to at least break even from the high type
contract we must have:
β ≥ 1− (K.θ.(1−α)F )2 ≥ 20.54%
For the bank to at least break even from the low type contract we must
have:
U(bank/(asym;Lcont)) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1+c.β)]+P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1+
c.β)] +R ≥ 0
This can be converted to a quadratic equation to get: β ≤ 78.9%
For the bank to break even from the high type contract we must have:
U(bank/(asym;Hcont)) = P .[T(β/Hcorp)−F.(1 + c.β)] +P .[T(β/Lcorp)−F.(1 +
c.β)] ≥ 0
The latter equation can be turned into a quadratic equation and we can
easily solve for β. We get β ≤ 66.9% for the bank to break even from the
hight type contract.
We can deduce that for the high type contract to be attractive to both
the bank and the high type corporation, we must have:
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9%
To test our findings we use a computer aided simulation (Excel in our
case). We adjust our contribution ratios β with an allowance γ and β with
an allowance λ . The use of such allowance will enable us to test for the
intervals where the contracts are attractive to the agents. The following
tables below show the payoffs to the agents under different allowances levels
for β and β.
7. DISCUSSION
We discuss our results from the standpoint of the two contract types
7.1. High type contract
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TABLE 3.
Payoff to the agents from high type contract when γ = 10%;λ = 10%
γ = 10%;λ = 10% β ≤ 78.9% β ≥ 78.9%
β < 20.54% 634;−7;−267 634;−7;−267
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 323; 74;−142 323; 74;−142
β > 66.9% −93; 136;−12 −93; 136;−12
TABLE 4.
Payoff to the agents from high type contract γ = 25%;λ = 25%
γ = 25%;λ = 25% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 670;−18;−283 670;−18;−283
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 323; 74;−142 323; 74;−142
β > 66.9% −258; 138; 20.54 −258; 138; 20.54
TABLE 5.
Payoff to the agents from high type contractγ = 10%;λ = 25%
γ = 10%;λ = 25% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 634;−7;−267 634;−7;−267
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 323; 74;−142 323; 74;−142
β > 66.9% −93; 136;−12 −93; 136;−12
TABLE 6.
Payoff to the agents from high type contract γ = 25%;λ = 10%
γ = 25%;λ = 10% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 670;−18;−283 670;−18;−283
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 323; 74;−142 323; 74;−142
β > 66.9% −258; 138; 20.54 −258; 138; 20.54
TABLE 7.
Payoff to the agents from Low type contract γ = 10%;λ = 10%
γ = 10%;λ = 10% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 132;−7;−395 −18;−7;−269
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 51; 74;−314 −25; 74;−187
β > 66.9% −85; 136;−252 −287; 136;−126
The first thing to remark is that when the high type contract is selected,
the outcome to the agent is the same regardless of the value of β.
Second, the only interval where the high type contract is attractive to
both the bank and the high type corporation is when 20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9%
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TABLE 8.
Payoff to the agents from Low type contract γ = 25%;λ = 25%
γ = 25%;λ = 25% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 303;−18;−478 −479;−18;−103
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 210; 74;−386 −297; 74;−10
β > 66.9% −128; 138;−322 −676; 138; 53
TABLE 9.
Payoff to the agents from Low type contract γ = 10%;λ = 25%
γ = 10%;λ = 25% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 292;−7;−467 −490;−7;−92
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 210; 74;−386 −297; 74;−10
β > 66.9% −126; 136;−324 −674; 136; 51
TABLE 10.
Payoff to the agents from Low type contract γ = 25%;λ = 10%
γ = 25%;λ = 10% β ≤ 78.9 β ≥ 78.9
β < 20.54% 143;−18;−406 −7;−18;−280
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 51; 74;−314 −25; 74;−187
β > 66.9% −87; 138;−250 −258; 138; 20.54
Third, the only time the high type contract is attractive to the low type
contract is when β > 66.9%. This choice however will never be set by the
bank as it results in a negative payoff to the bank.
Fourth, whenβ < 20.54% as λ increases from 10%to 25% the payoff to
the bank from the high type contract increases from 634 to 670 while that
of the corporation goes down fro −7 to −18. The reverse happens when
β > 66.9%.
This means that the only feasible choice is that when 20.54% ≤ β ≤
66.9%. This choice leads to the same payoff regardless of the level of
the allowances λ and γ. This choice is also unattractive to the low type
corpoartion.
7.2. Low type contract
Under all combination of λ and γ the only time the low type contract
is attractive to the low type corporation is when β > 66.9% and β >
78.9%. Yet this combination will never be chosen by the bank as it entails
a negative payoff to the bank.
The only choice that is both attractive to the high type corporation and
the bank is when 20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% and β < 78.9%. The payment from
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the low type corporation to the bank is improved by decreasing β by a
bigger allowance λ. (when λ increased from 10% to 25% the payoff to the
bank increased from 51 to 20.540 as in tables 7 and 8; 9 and 10).
From the discussion of high type contract and the low type contract, we
can notice that the only strategy left for the bank then is to set:
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% and β < 78.9% and λ = 25%
This strategy is unattractive to the low type corporation but attractive
to both the bank and the high type corporation. In fact the low type
corporation will not be interested in any contracts as the choice of any one
of them leads to it getting a negative payoff.
We are, then, having the following reduced form game from each type of
contracts:
TABLE 11.
Payoff to the bank and to the low type corporation under high and low
type contract and when λ = 25%
Low Type Corporation
P NP
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 323;−142 0; 0
Bank β ≤ 78.9% 210;−386 0; 0
TABLE 12.
Payoff to the bank and to the high type corporation under high and
low type contract and when λ = 25%
High Type Corporation
P NP
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% 323; 74 0; 0
Bank β ≤ 78.9% 210; 74 0; 0
7.3. Moral Hazards Premium (MHP)
It is clear that the lower type bank will not participate in any one of
the contracts as it gets a negative payoff from both contracts. This way we
have managed to reduce the problem of adverse selection as we are left with
only the high type corporation. It is clear, from the tables above (11 and
12) that both contracts yield positive payoffs to the bank. Consequently,
both the bank and the high type corporation will be willing to particiapte
in both contracts. Yet, the problem that remains is that the high type
corporation can still choose a lower type contract as it yields the same
payoff to it as the high type contract. This is a clear case of moral hazards
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that the after choosing the right corporation( Hight type), the latter might
not perform as efficiently as required
To solve this problem, we propose the introduction of an incentive in the
form of a premium. The agent can get such a premium only when proved
to have performed as required. The maximum value of such incentive is
the one that will equate the payoff to the bank under both contracts. We
called this incentive: the “Moral Hazard Premium (MHP)”. In our case,
the bank will be willing to pay a maximum of MPH = 323− 210 = 113 to
encourage the high type corporation to choose a high type contract.
The final reduced game given the “Moral Hazard Premium (MHP)” looks
like:
TABLE 13.
Payoff to the bank and to the high type corporation under high and
low type contract and when λ = 25% and and MHP=113
High Type Corporation
P NP
20.54% ≤ β ≤ 66.9% [210,323]; [74,187] 0; 0
Bank β ≤ 78.9% 210; 74 0; 0
We can notice that with the Moral Hazard premium, The high type con-
tract is indeed attractive for both the bank and the high type corporation.
Since, the payoff to the bank and to the high type corporation is given in an
interval format, the moral hazard premium opens up a room for negotiation
about how much premium is to be given.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we use a game theory mechanism to corporate financ-
ing using profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts. We employ mechanism
design theory using two agents, a bank and a corporation which seeks fi-
nancing through PLS mode. The corporation can be of two types (high or
low). We employ the usage of two types of contracts (low and high). The
purpose is to have each type of corporation choose a compatible type of
contracts (i.e. high type corporation should choose high type contracts and
vice versa).We found a theoretical evidence that this model helps well in
minimizing asymmetric information in two ways. The first is the reduction
of adverse selection. In our case the lower type of corporation is induced
to exit the game as both contracts (low and high) were proved to be not
attractive to it. Second, it helps in reducing moral hazards. In fact, the
high type corporation might still choose the low type contracts unless if we
introduce a moral hazard premium. Our results were also improved and
clarified with the use of computer aided simulation. Our choice of output
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function and model parameters was generic in nature. We suggest that this
model can be extended using specific sector data and then run the data in
a multiagent simulation interface such as Netlogo.
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